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Sometimes, It’s a Child and a Choice:
Toward an Embodied Abortion Praxis1
JEANNIE LUDLOW
Feminist analyses of recent abortion politics in the United States note
that the “abortion debate” has settled into a system of dichotomies, such
as the dichotomy between women’s autonomy on the abortion rights side
and the value of unborn life on the anti-abortion side. This article posits
that these dichotomizations contribute to the erosion of women’s access
and rights to abortion through loss of credibility for abortion rights discourse and loss of access to abortion praxis that can handle more complex
situations. Maintenance of the dichotomies requires denial or erasure
of more complicated situations, like late-second-trimester abortion and
situations in which women grieve their aborted fetuses. Drawing on her
experiences working in an abortion clinic, the author argues that a more
complete consideration of these more complex abortion experiences could
interrupt the erosion of our reproductive rights.
Keywords: abortion rights / Partial Birth Abortion Ban / fetus / late-term
abortion / abortion praxis / United States
It was my first D&X (dilation and extraction) procedure. I had been working as a patient advocate at an abortion clinic for about three weeks; the
patient was about 22 weeks LMP—that is, it had been about 22 weeks
since the first day of her last menstrual period, the point from which
doctors measure gestation, for purposes of consistency. The abortion was
elective. There was no fetal anomaly, no threat being posed to the woman
by her pregnancy. She simply could not afford to have a baby, and it took
her several months to save up the money for her abortion. According to
the Allan Guttmacher Institute, this woman is typical of second trimester abortion patients. The top four reasons women cite for having abortions after 16 weeks LMP are (in order): lack of knowledge that they are
pregnant; difficulty in making arrangements for the procedure (including
finances, transportation, and childcare); fear of telling their parents or partners about the pregnancy or abortion; and need for more time to come to
a decision about the pregnancy. Almost half of women having second trimester abortions cite financial or logistical reasons for waiting until after
sixteen weeks of pregnancy to abort (Allan Guttmacher Institute 2005). Of
course, as historian Rickie Solinger demonstrates in Beggars and Choosers, “choice” is complicated by these difficulties. Solinger explains how
in the United States, “choice” to abort is always already circumscribed
by race, class, access, and resources (2001, 6–7). In addition, Dorothy
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Roberts’ Killing the Black Body (1997) and Loretta J. Ross’ (1998) work on
African American women’s reproductive rights activism provide some of
the best analyses of the complexities of reproductive rights and activism
for Black women. As a scholar, I respect and agree with these interrogations into the limitations and circumscriptions of “choice.” As a provider,
however, I also recognize that circumscribed choices are still choices; to
suggest that only a full range of options equals “choice” not only detracts
from women’s attempts to empower themselves as much as possible but
also buys into the commodification of pregnancy and childbearing. Poor
women, women of color, young women, and women in very difficult living
situations make decisions based on the choices available to them, decisions made often with full awareness of the systems of power, privilege,
and oppression that circumscribe those choices, as Ross demonstrates in
her work (1998).
The D&X procedure I observed that day seemed interminable compared
to the first-trimester procedures to which I had already become accustomed. First-trimester procedures usually last less than five minutes; the
22-week D&X procedure took more than twenty minutes. The woman
was awake and alert during her abortion (we did not have the technology
at that time to offer sedation) as her advocate talked her through it: “I want
you to take a slow deep breath, and as I count, breathe out completely. As
we do this, you will feel a lot of pressure.” After the procedure was over,
I went into the surgery lab, where each surgery’s fetal tissue is checked to
insure completion of the procedure. The advocate trainer was checking
tissue that day, and the fully intact fetus, looking like a tiny baby, lay in
a glass dish, lighted from beneath. I drew my breath sharply. The trainer
took my hand and said, “Sometimes, I see these little ones and I am sad
for them. I don’t believe it’s just ‘tissue’ at this stage.” She reminded me
that the woman who chose this abortion had really good reasons for not
trying to parent this child, and it would be better for her entire family
if this little one were not a part of their lives right now. Then she said,
“Sometimes, patients ask me to baptize their fetuses, so I do. I sprinkle
them with just a little water and wish them safely into the next world.”
I was surprised and asked if she were religious. “Not like that,” she said,
“but I am spiritual and I believe I am doing spiritual work at the clinic.”
Then, she gave me some rubber gloves and left me alone with the fetal
body for a couple of minutes. On November 5, 2003, President George W.
Bush signed the “Partial-Birth Abortion Ban” into law, making illegal the
D&X procedure that I witnessed that day. Now, by law, 22-week abortion procedures either put women through prolonged labor and delivery
or result in dismembered fetal bodies. Since the majority of late-secondtrimester abortions involve women living in poverty, young women, and
women in difficult living situations, this law disproportionately affects
the most vulnerable of our patients.
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Mine is a story of the fetus that is not a part of the current public
discourse of U.S. abortion politics, although its telling is inspired by the
powerful history of abortion-related consciousness-raising in U.S. feminist politics. I offer this story as a contribution to the ongoing feminist
conversation about what happens in abortion politics when the fetus and
the pregnant woman are separated from one another in a process of discursive rupture, and women’s embodied experiences are excised from the
public discussion of abortion. Feminist analyses of abortion politics in the
past twenty years note that they break down into a dichotomization of
“fetus” from “woman” or, from an anti-abortion perspective, “mother”
from “child,” at best, a reductive way to think about a very complex issue
(Petchesky 1987, Hartouni 1992, Stabile 1992, Taylor 1992, Balsamo 1996,
Berlant 1997, Michaels 1999, and Stabile 1999). As many of these scholars demonstrate, this reductive approach has played a role in the gradual
diminishment of support for and access to abortion in the United States.
My own point of entry into this conversation is located at the intersection
of my ten years’ experience as an abortion clinic employee and my work
as a feminist academic, a location that provides me with a perspective
from which to analyze the discourse of abortion and its relationship both
to women’s lived experiences with abortion and to the political limits on
abortion.
In this paper, I begin with the unbridgeable discursive gap that characterizes the U.S. abortion debate. Within the context of this debate, women
are losing—not only through changes in Supreme Court membership and
recent legislation (including the complete ban on all abortions passed in
South Dakota and pending in my own state of Ohio in 2006), but also
through the gradual decrease of the number of doctors trained or willing
to perform abortions and the more rapid loss of public support for abortion rights. I argue that a more accurate understanding of abortion, which
includes a full range of women’s relationships to their fetuses and how
these various relationships shape individual abortion experiences, has
been elided by the dichotomization of abortion politics. As a 2005 New
York Times article explains, “While public conversation about abortion
is dominated by advocates with all-or-nothing positions . . . most patients
at [abortion] clinic[s], like most Americans, f[i]nd themselves on rockier
ground” (Leland 2005). This rockier ground is epitomized by the situations
that I examine in this paper: later-term second-trimester abortions and the
“Partial Birth Abortion Ban,” and women’s experiences of connection to
fetuses they choose to abort.
Cultural attention to these situations has been superseded by attention
to the strategies used by abortion rights activists to counter anti-abortion
contentions, strategies that have actually served to strengthen the dichotomizations central to abortion politics rather than to complicate our understanding of abortion in the United States. In the current cultural context,
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what is at stake in my analysis is nothing less than the maintenance and
reclamation of women’s access to a range of abortion options, via a fuller,
more complete representation of our lived experiences with abortion.
This more complete representation will challenge the absolutism of “the
abortion debate,” showing abortion experiences to be more complex and
more nuanced than generally acknowledged by those on either side of that
debate. If this more complex understanding of abortion experiences were
to become an element of our public abortion debate, I assert, it would be
much more difficult for anti-abortion activists to proffer simplistic solutions to what they sometimes call “the abortion problem.” This more
complex understanding of abortion experiences also complicates, and in
some ways challenges, the strategies that feminists have developed to
counter anti-abortion discourse; for this reason, my contribution to the
discourse is risky.2 This is, however, a risk that must be taken, and one
that has already been broached in the movement.
In the Winter 2004/2005 issue of Conscience, Frances Kissling, founder
of Catholics for a Free Choice, made waves in the abortion rights movement by calling for activists to attend to questions and concerns related
to the fetus. In “Is There Life after Roe? How to Think About the Fetus,”
Kissling argues “that the pro-choice movement must acknowledge the
moral value of a fetus—and the potentially painful reality of its loss”
(Traister 2005). She acknowledges the historical context of the dichotomization of fetuses and women in U.S. abortion discourse: “It has long been
a truism of the abortion debate that those who are prochoice have rights
and those who are against legal abortion have morality; that those who
support abortion rights concentrate on women and those opposed focus
on the fetus” (Kissling 2004/2005, 8). But now, Kissling argues, we need
to work toward “the development of an abortion praxis that combine[s]
respect for the fundamental right of women to choose abortion with an
ethical discourse that include[s] the exploration of how other values might
also be respected, including the value of developing human life,” thus
moving beyond the rather simplistic dichotomies that have characterized
U.S. abortion discourse (2004/2005, 2).
The responses to Kissling’s article have been strong and swift. Antiabortion responses predictably charge inconsistency: a Free Republic commentary is titled “The New Line of Pro-Choice: ‘Saying it’s wrong makes
it right’ ” (Vanderleun 2005), clearly reinscribing the dichotomy, while
John Mallon (2005), contributing editor to Inside the Vatican, posits that
Kissling’s article was evidence of “Cracks in the Wall.” Less predictable,
perhaps, have been the responses of some abortion rights activist leaders.
In The Village Voice, Ellie Smeal of the Feminist Majority Foundation
accuses Kissling of diverting the abortion debate to issues that are less
important than “putting the right wing on the defensive” and of simplifying the issue of abortion by talking only about potential sadness. “I don’t
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hear her saying that there’s joy sometimes,” Smeal is quoted as saying.
“I think if an 11-year-old is pregnant, it’s a great relief for her to have an
abortion” (Lerner 2004). Smeal’s example is problematically simplistic;
my own abortion at age 23 was a great relief, and I have worked with many
very young patients who, although they were strong in their determination
that abortion was the best choice for them, felt sad or ambivalent about
making that choice. Smeal’s charge that Kissling ignores the “joy” in turn
ignores the fact that much feminist discourse around abortion emphasizes its benefits to the exclusion of its complexities. Later, in Salon.com,
Smeal denies that Kissling’s argument is new. “Frances is not changing
the discussion . . . we are focused on keeping women’s fundamental rights
for reasons of her survival. Of course we are moral, feeling people” (Traister 2005). In fact, Smeal argues that the focus on what is perceived to
be “new” in Kissling’s argument may be the result of an attempt by “the
press” “to start infighting on the liberal side” (Traister 2005).
Like Smeal, Susan Hill, president of the National Women’s Health
Organization, accuses Kissling of diverting attention away from where
the movement needs to be focused—on women. She says, “It’s so frustrating to hear people discussing the fetus but not discussing the woman”
(Traister 2005). Hill’s response, like Smeal’s, is reductive and reinscribes
the dichotomy of fetus/woman that Kissling is clearly trying to challenge.
Surely, in Kissling’s call for “combin[ing] respect” for women’s right to
choose with “exploration[s]” of the “value of developing human life”
is an explicit consideration of both fetus and woman, not fetus at the
expense of woman. And Rosalind Petchesky, one of the most respected
and prolific scholars on abortion rights, has reportedly sent Kissling an
e-mail response. “If and when those who dominate anti-abortion politics
could for a minute take seriously the rights to a decent life and health of
born children,” the e-mail says, “maybe then we could start to talk about
advancing respect for fetal life, early or late” (Lerner 2004). Petchesky’s
response demonstrates the challenge to the abortion rights movement
posed by deconstructing the dichotomies that characterize the abortion
debate in the United States.
At the same time, it is very possible that Smeal’s concerns about
attempts to portray the movement as conflicted are correct. I could find
only one prominent activist organization leader quoted in the media
speaking positively of Kissling’s argument. Lerner briefly quotes Joan
Malin, CEO of Planned Parenthood of New York City, as acknowledging
that the consideration Kissling asks for is already happening on the private
level for most women. She says, “I have never seen a woman take the
decision lightly” (Lerner 2004). More recently, I have found a consonant
message on the website of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers
(NCAP), which is constructing a linked page call “heartssite.com” whose
purpose is “to make the American public more tolerant and comfortable
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with abortion, with the ultimate goal being the elimination of the abortion
stigma” (NCAP 2005), by collecting individuals’ stories about their experiences—joyful and fraught—with abortion. The abortion rights activists’
responses to Kissling’s article, although surprising, are hardly inconsistent
with the history of abortion discourse in the United States. As Smeal says,
“The polls have been the same for 30 years . . . And in reality, so is the
debate” (Traister 2005).
In this paper, I argue that Frances Kissling is on to something: hidden
in the gap of the U.S. abortion debate is the relationship between woman
and fetus, a relationship that many women consider seriously when they
choose abortion, a relationship that is not honored by a legal mandate that
late second-trimester procedures dismember the fetal body. Based on my
experiences as an abortion clinic employee, I claim a role of witness to this
relationship—sometimes characterized by connection and sometimes by
distance—in order to demonstrate that Kissling’s challenge that we attend
to the fetus is correct, and also that, in the clinic where I work (and in
many other abortion clinics), this attention is already a powerful force. In
my role as witness, I can be accountable to Smeal’s request for the stories
of joy and Petchesky’s call to take seriously the rights to life and health of
the already-born—I see and work toward both on a regular basis, both in
the clinic and in my other activist work. As I integrate an examination of
my own experiences working in the clinic with an analysis of the language
of and responses to the “Partial Birth Abortion Ban,” I will show that the
discourses surrounding the ban are illustrative of the larger conversation
around U.S. abortion politics. Finally, I will explain why the ban demonstrates not the concern for the fetus that its proponents claim but, rather,
a clear disdain for any connection that a woman choosing abortion might
feel for her fetus.
Descriptions of my work with patients serve to reinsert women’s experiences into abortion discourse and challenge the notion that in abortion politics we are forced to choose between pregnant women and their potential
babies. I offer this analysis in response to the recent exhortations not only of
Frances Kissling but also of several feminist scholars that we in the abortion
rights movement seriously consider the fetus (Duden 1993, Franklin 1999,
Oaks 1999, Hartouni 1999, and Shrage 2003). Like Laurie Shrage, I strive
to introduce into abortion discourse representations of the fetus that serve
to “appropriat[e] the ‘managed fetus’ for subversive purposes” (2003, 127);
however, unlike Shrage, I am interested in the images and discussions that
already circulate in U.S. abortion practice in the clinic.3 Like Kissling, I
think we should consider the fetus’ place in women’s abortion experiences,
not iconicize it. I will focus on second trimester abortion, to demonstrate
the correlation between the power of the woman/fetus dichotomy and the
political and social success of the “Partial Birth Abortion Ban.” My analysis
is organized around activist slogans in order to illustrate, simultaneously,
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how those slogans relates to and extends the popular discourse around
abortion and how reductive that popular discourse ultimately is. It is my
intention to show that the real and complex abortion experiences of women
extend beyond the limits of the debate and thus simultaneously embody
“pro-life” and “pro-choice” values.

It’s a Child, Not a Choice
One of the most popular anti-abortion bumper stickers in my region of
the Midwest features a line drawing of a fetus surrounded by an amniotic sac next to the phrase, “It’s a Child, not a Choice.” This sentiment,
which illustrates perfectly the fetus/woman dichotomy, effectively defines
fetal personhood and claims the fetus as a symbol of anti-choice politics.
Because the assignation of personhood to the fetus is a common trope
in mainstream anti-abortion discourse, Kissling’s assertion that “those
opposed (to abortion) focus on the fetus” may actually be an understatement. I have found that, in activist discourse, the figure of the fetus
belongs to anti-abortionists, for whom it has been a source of considerable
strength. The anti-abortion movement began utilizing images of the fetal
body in 1973, immediately after Roe v. Wade. The abortion rights movement’s response to these images has primarily been to divert attention
away from the fetus and onto women’s rights, as in “woman’s right to
choose” or a woman’s right to her own bodily integrity. Of course these are
important considerations, particularly within the context of a society that
romanticizes motherhood but does not honor mothering, especially mothering by poor women, women of color, and young women. However, the
inevitable result of this diversion has been an almost complete excision of
the fetus from abortion rights discourse and the simultaneous association
of representations of the fetus with anti-abortion discourses.
This association reaches its ultimate expression in the language of the
“Partial Birth Abortion Ban,” which George W. Bush signed into law on
November 5, 2003, setting historical precedent by outlawing an elective
medical procedure not because it was scientifically proven to be unsafe,
but because it was deemed by politicians to be disturbing. Although the
ban was put under appeal by several state and local actions immediately
upon its passage, and remains under appeal as I revise this article, it was
celebrated as a victory for anti-abortion politics. Sen. George Voinovich
(R., Ohio) is quoted as claiming triumphantly, “[t]oday is a glorious day . . .
We can now begin to save human lives” (McFeatters 2003). “Partial birth
abortion” is a label chosen by politicians that serves to increase people’s
discomfort with a procedure that is more appropriately known as “Intact
Dilation and Evacuation” (Intact D&E) or more commonly “Dilation and
Extraction” (D&X). Descriptions of this procedure have become part of our
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cultural discourse of abortion. Carol Mason demonstrates that the phrase
“partial birth” is intended to counter the statement in Roe “that a fetus
is not a person.” Although unborn fetuses may not be persons, those in
the process of being born are not unborn and, therefore, are not designated
by Roe as not-persons (2002, 81). I have found this fine distinction to be
reflected in the language of the 2003 congressional findings of the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act.
The congressional findings—a record of the congressional hearings and
fact-finding that inform the debates around an act that may eventually
become a law—emphasize that in this procedure, the fetus is “inches from
being born” and deemphasize the number of weeks between the procedure
and the fetus’ possible viability. For example, following the language of
the findings, even a 20-week fetus with no chance of surviving outside of
the womb for at least six more weeks, even with extensive technomedical intervention, is “only inches from being” a child, a sentiment that
reinforces the public discourse that the fetuses being aborted in D&X
procedures are “almost children.” For instance, in an opinion piece in
the National Law Journal, Jay Sekulow, chief counsel to the American
Center for Law and Justice, characterizes the procedure as on the border
between the born and the unborn: “Partial-birth procedures represent the
beachhead of abortion’s assault on postnatal life, the bridge between abortion and infanticide. Partial-birth procedures open the way to legal infanticide.” Sekulow notes that the next incarnation of the Supreme Court
“could conclude that a human being who is partially outside the mother’s
body is a person entitled to the equal protection of the law” (2004, 26).
Sekulow does not examine the extent to which the law should—or could—
protect a 20-week fetus, without functioning lungs or nervous system,
who is “partially outside the mother’s body.”
Both the ban itself, as signed into law, and the congressional findings
in the initial act begin with short descriptions of the procedure that is
banned. Because the two descriptions are not identical, a comparative
examination of their language can expose the underlying assumptions
behind the ban. For example, in the language of the law, when “the person
performing the abortion” (who is not named as a physician or health care
professional) is invoked, the object of the sentence is a “living fetus,”
implying that the abortion is performed on the fetus, that the fetus is the
patient rather than the woman having the abortion. In addition, when
the woman on whom the abortion actually is being performed is invoked,
she is referred to as “the body of the mother.” This is a clear example not
only of a discursive separation of a fetus from the body that must sustain
it, but also an inversion of personhood status, so that the fetus becomes
the person (patient) and the pregnant woman becomes a “body,” relegated
to the status of vessel. Thus, according to the language of the ban that
President Bush signed into law, a “partial-birth abortion” is one in which
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(A) the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire
fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother,
for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the
partially delivered living fetus; and (B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus. (“Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act,” SEC. 3, Chapter 74, Sec. 1531, b1AB, 2003)4

In comparison to the language of the ban as signed into law, that of the
congressional findings describes the procedure as
an abortion in which a physician deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living, unborn child’s body until either the entire baby’s head is outside the
body of the mother, or any part of the baby’s trunk past the navel is outside the
body of the mother and only the head remains in the womb, for the purpose of
performing an overt act (usually the puncturing of the back of the child’s skull
and removing the baby’s brains) that the person knows will kill the partially
delivered living infant, performs this act, and then completes delivery of the
dead infant— . . . a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited. (“Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,”
Congressional Findings SEC. 2, (1), 2003)

Most notable in this description, which presumably informed congressional debates surrounding the passage of the bill, is the language used to
name the fetus. Although the ban consistently refers to “the fetus,” the
congressional findings uses language that most U.S. citizens associate
with either the successful completion of a pregnancy or with anti-abortion
discourse—“unborn child,” “baby,” “child,” and “infant”—to refer to the
fetus. The connotative difference between the two descriptions is obvious
when we read them together; “fetus” is a less emotionally-charged term
than “baby,” “child” or “infant,” all of which confer personhood on the
fetus. The phrase “dead infant” serves to “mobilize a desire to protect” the
fetus—to personalize the abortion procedure and the fetus, in a manner
similar to anti-abortion photos of fetuses in utero, as Lauren Berlant has
argued (1997, 110).
At the same time, the language of the findings designates the “person
performing the abortion” to be a “physician,” while the language of the
law uses the longer descriptor; it is important to note that the language
of the findings preceded the language of the law. Therefore, the shift from
“physician” in the act and findings to “person performing the abortion”
in the actual law would make the ban applicable to abortions performed
by physicians’ assistants (and by non-medical personnel) as well as by
physicians. In addition, the findings describes in some detail (and in
evocative language) what the ban names more generally the “overt act
that the person knows will kill” the fetus. The detailed and evocative
description in the findings could limit the scope of the ban, while the more
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general description in the ban would insure that the law is applicable to
a broader range of abortion procedures. If, for example, a physician were
able to determine that another act (besides intrauterine cranial decompression) could lead to a successful intact removal of the fetal body through
a woman’s partially-dilated cervix, the intact abortion procedure which
utilized that act might not be covered by the description in the congressional findings, but it could be covered by the law as it was passed. And,
of course, the findings’ phrase, “gruesome and inhumane procedure,” is
inappropriate for inclusion in a law, although its strategic utility in the
congressional findings cannot be overstated.
The shifts from the language used in the act’s congressional findings
to the language used in the ban—from specific to general descriptions
and from emotion-laden names for the fetus to more neutral medical
terminology—are evidence that the law contains traces of anti-abortion
discourse. In addition, the language of the ban indicates a shift in antiabortion discourse, from a pornography of images of dismemberment to a
pornography of descriptive discourse. The language of the ban both relies
on and perpetuates the assignation of personhood to the fetus in service
to the ultimate goal of ending all abortions. In fact, Matt Trewhella, of
Missionaries to the Preborn, explains in Life Advocate how the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban could lead to the prohibition of abortion, by revealing “pro-abortion legislators” to be “brutes,” thereby “causing them to
be unseated” (NARAL 2005). Even Randall Terry, founder of Operation
Rescue, admits in a news release in September 2003 (only two months
before the ban was signed into law), that the ban was “a political scam”
that “may not save one child’s life” but, because of the public debate
surrounding the bill, it is “a public relations goldmine” (NARAL 2005).
These activists, whose efforts to sway public opinion about this particular procedure began almost ten years before the bill was signed into law,
clearly perceive the ban to be a political victory for anti-abortion forces.
The response from abortion rights activists has been less emphatic. Many
decry the ban’s prohibition against a medical procedure, but few, if any,
have taken up the cause of defending the D&X procedure from charges that
it is “gruesome and inhumane.” In addition, the lukewarm responses of
abortion rights activists, organizations, and scholars to the ban have served
not to deconstruct the woman/fetus dichotomy but, rather, to broaden the
discursive gap that characterizes U.S. abortion discourse.

“My Body, My Choice”
A popular slogan among abortion rights advocates in my region is “My
Body, My Choice,” a slogan that serves as an illustration of what Kissling
critiques as the “prochoice movement’s” unwavering focus on women’s
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legal—and sometimes abstract—right to choose. She notes, “This often
means a reluctance to even consider whether or not fetal life has value,
or . . . attempt to define that value or to see how it can be promoted
with restricting access to legal abortion” (2). In the slogan “My Body,
My Choice,” as in much abortion rights discourse, the fetus is invisible,
excised by fears that discussions of the fetus and of women’s varied relationships to their fetuses will lead inevitably to anti-abortion sentiment.
If, as Kissling argues, the “prochoice movement” has been too focused on
women’s right to choose (perhaps to its own detriment), our reasons were
certainly understandable.
The abortion rights movement’s early responses to the issue of fetal
personhood were diversionary: countering images of “dead fetuses” with
images of “dead women.” The most famous of these were Gerri Twerdy
Santoro in the early 1970s (died from illegal abortion induced by her boyfriend, in 1964), Rosie Jiménez in the late 1970s (died in 1977 of an illegal
abortion after passage of the Hyde Amendment made it impossible for
her to afford a legal abortion), and Becky Bell in the late 1980s (died from
an illegal abortion in 1988 after Indiana’s parental consent laws led her
to choose illegal abortion over disappointing her parents). These women’s
tragic stories served to balance the mangled fetal bodies that increasingly
became a staple of anti-abortion discourse. In the 1990s, in order to palliate
its message for a backlash-educated audience that was increasingly wary
of feminism, abortion rights discourse became a more abstract discourse
of “choice,” rights, and policies rather than an embodied discourse.
When I began working at the clinic in 1996, activist discourse named
women “private citizens,” not mothers, lovers, or daughters, and the fetus
was called a “pregnancy,” if it was invoked at all. While this approach
served to divert attention away from anti-abortion images of dismembered fetuses, it also diverted abortion rights activism and theory away
from women’s lived experiences of pregnancy and abortion and, in many
ways, failed to provide real women with accurate representations of our
experiences.
More recently, some abortion rights activists have argued that antiabortion images of the fetus are all inaccurate, a denial response that actually solidifies the dichotomization of woman/fetus. Based on my work in
the clinic, I can witness to the fact that some anti-abortion fetal images
and descriptions are indeed inaccurate and often racist. For instance, our
state-mandated “informed consent” information includes a full-color
booklet on fetal development whose images resemble Lennart Nilsson’s
fetal photographs, famously published on the cover of Life magazine
in 1965. These Life-like fetal images have been computer-enhanced to
resemble white babies, including eyebuds colorized to look blue, and skin
colorized to look light pink. The famous anti-abortion film Silent Scream
constructs an incredible story of a nine-week fetus with consciousness and
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ability to experience pain during abortion, even though researchers who
are convinced that fetal pain is possible estimate that the earliest gestational stage at which this is a risk is 20 weeks and a JAMA clinical review
article, “Fetal Pain: A Systemic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence”
finds that the more plausible stage is 29–30 weeks LMP (Anand 2004, Lee,
et al, 2005). Other representations of the fetus are just plain silly, such as
those ubiquitous on-line poems, written in the “voice” of a fetus, ending
with statements like “today, my mommy killed me.”
Just as often, however, anti-abortion fetal images are not inherently
inaccurate. One of the earliest anti-abortion images I can remember
seeing was the “tiny feet” poster, which shows two tiny feet with toes,
looking almost fully-developed; in the clinic where I work, a technician
measures the fully-formed feet from each fetal body over 9 weeks LMP,
confirming fetal age and development in the context of ascertaining the
successful completion of the procedure. And anti-abortion advertising
often uses photos that resemble Nilsson’s to draw attention to fetal development in addition to their popular photos of dismembered fetuses. What
I have found is that these photos do look like fetuses we see in our clinic,
although the gestational ages of the fetuses in the photos are often understated by two-to-four weeks, giving the impression, for example, that the
photo of a ten-week fetus is instead a photo of a seven- or eight-week fetus.
In fact, a fetus as young as 9 weeks LMP can have tiny, fully-formed feet,
and a fetus at sixteen weeks can indeed (as a particular anti-abortion ad
says) “make a fist, get hiccups and suck her thumb.” Accuracy of an image
should not, however, be read as indication of the image’s political innocence. Ultimately, I agree with feminist scholars who argue that there are
no “innocent” images of the fetus (Stabile 1999, Taylor 1992, Petchesky
1987, Berlant 1997, Hartouni 1992, 1999 and Balsamo 1996). As Stabile
reminds us, we ignore the politics behind images to our own disadvantage.
Even seemingly innocuous images of the fetus, she notes, are implicated
in “the massive infrastructure behind the anti-abortion movement’s propaganda” (1999, 135). I argue that the abortion rights activist movement’s
reticence to engage in discussions of the fetal body has left the door open
for all uses of fetal imagery to be read as anti-abortion.
Just as abortion rights activists’ responses to anti-abortion imagery tend
either to divert or deny—to divert attention away from the unpleasant
claims associated with those images or to deny the anti-abortion images
that are representational of the fetus—so have our responses to the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban. When the ban was first introduced to the U.S. public
in 1993, anti-abortion activists began with a media blitz of misinformation
and disgust-mongering. The now-famous images of the procedure (particularly of the intrauterine cranial decompression) were placed in newspaper
ads, in brochures and on-line. Under a headline asking, “Do these drawings
shock you?” the ad warns, “We are sorry, but we think you should know
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the truth.” Beneath this declaration is a column of line-drawn images
juxtaposed with exaggerated and inflammatory textual descriptions of the
D&X abortion procedure (Gianelli 1993, 3). As these ads were more widely
distributed, leaders of the abortion rights movement were asked to comment on the procedure. Almost immediately, the responses became denials. The National Abortion Federation (NAF) first said that the procedure
was only performed on women whose fetuses were already dead (Gianelli
1993, 21); Barbara Radford, then-head of NAF, retracted this claim almost
immediately. The next response was that the procedure was rare; NAF
claimed that late-second trimester and third-trimester abortions were very
rare and that only “a handful of doctors” used the D&X procedure (Gianelli
1993, 21). Although the Allan Guttmacher Institute estimates that fewer
than two percent of abortions in the United States are performed after
the twentieth week of pregnancy, anti-abortion activists argue that, with
an annual abortion rate of nearly 1.3 million per year, two percent equals
approximately 26,000 abortions performed after 20 weeks LMP, when
D&X would most likely be used (2005). Gianelli reports that in the 1990s
“doctors who use the (D&X) technique acknowledged doing thousands of
such procedures a year . . . the majority . . . on healthy fetuses and healthy
women,” and that at one facility alone, almost 1500 D&X procedures were
performed in one year. Another physician, in Nebraska, reported that he
performed about 500 D&X procedures a year (1997, 54–5).
Both of the claims made by abortion rights activists, that D&X was
used rarely and largely in cases of fetal anomaly or death, entered public
discourse before they were effectively retracted. In 1995, Ron Fitzsimmons, head of NCAP, said on Nightline that “the procedure was used
rarely and only on women whose lives were in danger or whose fetuses
were damaged” (Stout 1997, A11). Two years later in a statement that
made headlines, Fitzsimmons admitted he “lied through [his] teeth” in
that interview. But the damage was done; while vetoing an early version of the ban in 1996, President Clinton invoked the information that
the procedure was rare and only performed in extreme circumstances.
He vetoed the law on behalf of “a few hundred women every year who
have personally agonizing situations where their children are . . . about
to be born with terrible deformities” (Stout 1997, A11). This campaign
of misinformation, of denial, has been embarrassing for abortion rights
activists. Although Ron Fitzsimmons is quoted in the New York Times
article as saying that he “continue[s] to support the procedure and abortion rights in general” (Stout 1997, A11), a mere week later, he is quoted
in American Medical News as saying that the abortion rights movement
should “roll over and play dead” regarding the ban, rather than trying to
fight it. He says, “We’re fighting a bill that has the support of, what, 78%
of the public? That tells me that we have a PR problem” (Gianelli 1997,
55). Fitzsimmons is right, there is a public relations problem regarding
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D&X, and his initial denial responses—as well as those of other pro-choice
activists—have played a significant role in creating that problem. If these
activists had not made statements about the procedure that were judged
untrue, and instead explained why the procedure was safer than the lateterm dismemberment procedures that have now replaced it, then antiabortion claims about the procedure would not have been strengthened
by a loss of credibility in the abortion rights movement. In fact, when
Fitzsimmons’ admission came to light, President Clinton backpedaled on
his veto, saying he was opposed to “using the procedure on healthy women
with healthy fetuses”: a White House spokesperson is quoted as saying,
“if this procedure is being used on an elective basis, where there’s another
procedure available, the president would be happy to sign legislation that
would ban it” (Padawer 1997).
Although anti-abortion organizations continued to target D&X in their
activism and imagery and several state-level laws banning D&X were in
courts in the late 1990s, the national public discourse around the procedure died down in 1997, until 2002 when it became clear that President
Bush was poised to sign a ban into law. At that time, the major abortion
rights organizations and their leaders reverted to diversion, a familiar
tactic within the movement, historically. Even now, when the ban is
invoked, the standard response from the Planned Parenthood Federation
of America, NARAL/Pro-Choice America, the National Abortion Federation, and other national abortion rights organizations is to focus on privacy
and, still, on stories of extreme cases. The federal government, they assert,
should not be making medical decisions for women.
This, of course, is true, but it does not address the claims, now common
in public discourse, that D&X is cruel and inhumane, nor does it explain
why D&X became such a widely-used procedure in the first place. The
reason these two issues are not addressed by abortion rights advocates is
directly related to the movement’s reticence, as recognized by Kissling,
to engage in discourse about the fetus. The ban clearly increases limitations on women’s rights to control fertility and choose parenthood; it sets
a dangerous precedent by making illegal a safe, effective, elective medical procedure; and it represents a reassertion of patriarchal power over,
particularly, the most vulnerable women’s bodies. Of course, the abortion rights response is not inaccurate; it is merely incomplete and thus
ineffective in the public arena.
The U.S. attorney who is defending the ban in a New York appeal has
argued that “this procedure is never in the best interest of the mother”
(Edwards 2003). This statement is baldly incorrect; there are reasons why
D&X is sometimes in the best interest of the patient, but presenting these
reasons requires abortion rights activists to speak honestly about pregnant
women’s varied relationships to their fetuses as well as about the fetal
body. The D&X procedure was developed by Dr. Martin Haskell, an Ohio
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physician, and first presented at a 1992 meeting of the National Abortion
Federation, a trade association of abortion providers (Haskell 1992, see
also Gianelli 1993).
The procedure was promoted to solve a problem common to late
second-trimester suction abortions. In standard suction abortions, the
fetal body falls apart, is dismembered. During the second trimester of
pregnancy, the fetus’ bone tissue begins to harden from a cartilage-like
state into bone. One of the most dangerous complications of a late secondtrimester suction abortion for the patient is that the uterine wall might
be lacerated or perforated by fetal bone tissue, in severe cases potentially
necessitating hysterectomy. If the fetus is removed intact, no sharp bony
edges are exposed, and perforation is thus avoided. One way to accomplish
intact removal is via induction abortion—basically induced labor—a procedure almost like childbirth, much longer in duration and often more
expensive and more painful than suction procedures. The D&X procedure
is a compromise that combines the relatively quick (usually less than
thirty minutes) duration of a suction procedure with the decreased risk of
perforation provided by intact removal.5
I have attended women having these procedures; the woman has typically been under a very light anesthesia (often called “twilight sleep”—
awake and responsive, but woozy and relaxed), is able to walk with support
immediately after the procedure, and is often fully alert and comfortable
within an hour or a little more. In the mid-1990s, before we had the equipment necessary for anesthetization, all our D&X patients underwent the
procedure with local anesthesia and the assistance of a patient advocate
trained in relaxation techniques. These patients were able to drive themselves home from the clinic after their recovery time. Therefore, one
benefit of the D&X procedure is that it provides a level of patient safety
and comfort for late second-trimester abortions that is not available with
most other methods—methods that involve either surgery on the uterus,
protracted contractions and delivery, or the dismemberment of the fetus
and an increased risk of uterine laceration or perforation. The fact that
dismemberment procedures (surely “gruesome” in their own right) are
not prohibited by the ban suggests that the incentive behind the ban is
not to protect women (or fetuses) from that which is cruel but, rather, to
subject women who choose second trimester abortion to increased discomfort (and greater risk) than they would experience with the safer, more
comfortable D&X procedure.
Another benefit of D&X is emotional. Many of the women I have
known who chose abortion during the second half of the second trimester experienced some ambiguity around their decisions: nationally, about
ten percent choose to abort a previously-wanted pregnancy in the second
trimester because of changes in family situation (divorce, chronic illness
of another child, loss of employment, etc.), about two percent choose to
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abort a wanted fetus that has developed health complications with which
the family is not prepared to cope, and almost half undergo a late abortion because the woman was financially or emotionally unprepared for an
abortion earlier in the pregnancy (Allan Guttmacher Institute 2005). In any
of these cases, the woman may have developed emotional connections to
the fetus growing inside her. In these situations, it can be beneficial to the
woman (and often to her family) to have an opportunity, post-procedure,
to hold her fetus’ body, to say goodbye to her baby, to grieve for a child
rather than for a mass of dismembered tissue. I know women who have
been allowed to spend time with their intact aborted fetuses’ bodies, and
they feel that this time was important to their healing in a difficult—and
chosen—situation.
When faced with questions about this “gruesome” procedure, abortion rights leaders have been disappointingly weak in its defense. Why
did these activists fail to explain the physical and emotional benefits of
D&X procedures when the ban was being debated in the public arena? In
order to do so, they would have had to speak honestly about the fetal body
and some pregnant women’s relationships to their fetuses. As Frances
Kissling has so eloquently argued, this is not a discussion abortion rights
activists have been able to engage in to date, in spite of repeated calls by
some feminist theorists that we do so. She argues, “For some the right to
choose abortion seems to include the right to be protected from thinking
about the fetus and from any pain that might result from others’ talking
about the fetus in value-laden terms” (2004/2005, 3). If we in the abortion
rights movement would only speak honestly about the fetus and practice
an embodied abortion praxis, we would be able to insist on the legality of
this procedure, not because it is rare and necessary, but because it makes
the abortion experiences of all women, regardless of age, class, or living
situation, safer and more comfortable, as they should be.

Pro Child Pro Choice
Another popular slogan used by abortion rights advocates is the seemingly
simple “Pro Child Pro Choice.” Although it may be read as reinscribing
the dichotomies that characterize the abortion debate, including the
dichotomization of fetus from woman, of child from autonomous choice,
and the construct “pro child” echoes with traces of “pro-natalism,” this
slogan does come closer than most to providing a deconstruction of the
dichotomies that shape the abortion debate. As with any deconstruction,
the key to understanding the relationship between the dichotomized
terms is in the gap between the terms. If anti-abortion discourse effectively “aborts” the woman’s body from their descriptions of the fetus and,
as Frances Kissling suggests, “the conventional wisdom in the prochoice
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movement has been that talking about fetal life is counterproductive”
(2004/5, 4), then the varied relationships with their fetuses that women
describe, and discursively produce, have been relegated to the gap between
these political poles. As Linda Layne writes about feminist responses
to miscarriage (which doctors call “spontaneous abortion”), “feminists
have avoided any discussion of fetuses for fear of adding fuel to the antiabortionists’ fire” (1999, 251). Layne proposes that in order to open the
discourse of pregnancy to the experiences of all women, feminists should
“focus on the iterative process by which individuals and their social
networks materially and socially produce (or opt not to produce) a new
member of the community” (252). In other words, Layne challenges us to
recognize that the distinction between a fetus and a baby is defined not by
gestational development but through social relationships—the pregnant
woman’s with her fetus, her family, and her community—whether the
pregnancy ends in childbirth or miscarriage or, I would add, abortion.
The powerful work of Judith Arcana, both her poetry in the recently
published What If Your Mother (2005) and her scholarship on motherhood,
explores the influence of this matrix of relationality on women’s experiences with pregnancy and abortion. In “Abortion Is a Motherhood Issue,”
she writes about the separation of abortion from “discussions of mothering, even when those discussions are carried on in the voices and writings
of women of consciousness.” This separation, she notes, has many causes,
including strategic separation in order to deflect the responses of “rightto-lifers.” But “sometimes,” she writes, the separation of abortion from
motherhood happens because “we forget that abortion is, in the ordinary
motherhood-type way, the concern of women who are taking responsibility
for the lives of their children” (1994, 160).
When I began working in an abortion clinic, the clinic director was an
activist who was not afraid to discuss the fetus. She told me a story about
her appearance on a syndicated radio call-in show during which a caller
challenged her to deny that late-second trimester abortions “kill babies.”
“At that stage of pregnancy,” the caller said, “you can’t tell me it’s not
a baby. And you can’t tell me that, if that baby is aborted, it won’t die.”
Rather than engage in discussion about the definition of life (a discussion
anti-abortion discourse has already delimited in the public realm, if not
yet in the medical and legal realms), she simply said to him, “Yes. It’s a
baby and yes, it is killed. I want to talk about all the reasons why so many
women choose to have abortions even though they know this, and why
it is important that women are allowed to make that choice.” The caller
simply hung up the phone. When the director told me this story, I thought,
I guess he did not have an argument prepared that would answer the
complexity of women’s lived experiences. During my first two months in
training at the clinic, I worked closely with women who were able to think
clearly and compassionately about the fetus and about women who choose
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abortions for whatever reason (even reasons with which I am uncomfortable). Although I identified as strongly pro-choice and had benefited from
my own abortion experience when I was younger, I was initially surprised
by some of the practices followed at the clinic to allow each woman to
articulate her own “iterative process” by which her relationship to her
fetus was produced.
When I speak with a woman about her abortion decision during our
intake screening, I am always careful to use the language she uses to name
the fetus. Some women say “pregnancy” and a great many merely say “it”;
when a woman says “it,” I usually say “fetus,” deliberately choosing the
most medical-sounding term. Very few patients say “fetus” or “embryo.”
The majority say “baby,” as in “this baby is making me sicker than my
previous ones did” or “I just can’t have this baby at this time.” When I
began my training, I was shocked to hear clinic employees calling fetuses
“babies”—as a strong feminist activist, I had learned to separate the two.
But, as one of my co-workers explained to me, “if the woman who is
choosing abortion experiences this as a baby, how are we helping her deal
with her decision if we tell her she is wrong?” Now, when my patient calls
her fetus “baby,” I do, too. Sometimes women will express their wish that
they could have this baby as they explain why they cannot, as in, “I would
really like to have this baby. I hoped it might be a girl. But my relationship is not stable and I cannot afford another child on my own.” This is
an iteration of the fetus that illustrates how many women do think about
their relationships to the fetus when they make their choices to abort,
and many consider the baby that fetus is (or will become) to them. Often,
patients who indicate that spirituality is important to them tell me that
they have prayed about their abortion decisions and have asked the deity
to which they pray to send back to them the child they are aborting, at a
time in the future when they are better able to care for it.
I acknowledge that these iterations of maternal-fetal connection are
challenging in the context of current abortion politics. However, I am
convinced that if we in the abortion rights movement told more of
these stories, the stories would come to seem less shocking to us. Their
telling would not lead to a weakening of our stance, to a strengthening
of anti-abortion politics, as is often feared. Rather, I believe that these
stories, which integrate traces of anti-abortion principles into abortion
experiences, could begin the process of deconstructing the dichotomies
that characterize the U.S. abortion debate and strengthen general public
support for even challenging situations.
These stories complicate the simplistic politics of abortion by emphasizing the similarities between abortion and motherhood and collapsing
the differences between concern for women and our choices and concern
for fetal life. In other words, the honest stories of complex lives made a
little less difficult by complicated choices would allow more people to
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recognize abortion as one possible outcome of potential motherhood, as
Arcana describes it. One of the charges that the anti-abortion movement
makes of abortion rights activists, abortion providers, and women who
abort is that we are “heartless.” Kissling quotes John Garvey who wrote
in Commonweal that “perhaps there has been a ‘hardening of the heart’
resulting from the prochoice position” (2004/5, 5). I see Garvey’s point,
but I wish he could talk with the patients and co-workers I have known
at the clinic, that he, and others who think similarly, could see what goes
on in some abortion clinics.6
In a 2003 Glamour article titled “Are You Ready to Really Understand Abortion?” the techniques of a particular group of abortion clinics
are examined. This group’s strategies were developed in response to an
onslaught of Operation Rescue actions in 1989. Through my work, I have
attended workshops with employees of these clinics, and many of our
clinic practices are similar to theirs. Our services include grief counseling (for women who want it), and options counseling about adoption and
motherhood (for most women). We strive to incorporate into the abortion
experience each patient’s own religious values and emotional needs on
an individual basis. Our patients fill out charts which include questions
about their emotional responses to their pregnancies/abortions (are you
happy? confident? relieved? sad? angry? trapped? scared?), their religious
beliefs regarding abortions, and their support systems at home. We see a
range of needs and responses, from the woman who is happily relieved not
to be pregnant anymore to the woman who grieves deeply the child she
will not birth and help the latter plan coping strategies for their grieving.
In the clinics featured in the Glamour article, patients can write heartshaped letters to their fetuses, to other women in the clinic, or to their
god telling about their feelings. These letters are posted on clinic walls.
One is quoted: “I love you even though I know in my heart I can’t keep
you. But the memory of you will make me strong.” It is signed, “All my
love, the mom you’ll never meet” (Chen 2003, 264). A very similar letter
hangs in the clinic where I work; this one was written by a 15-year-old
patient. These are not experiences of disembodiment, of separation of
woman from fetus, of mother from child. These are the experiences that
speak to the complexity of abortion as it is lived by women rather than as
it is expounded by activists.
Imagine the following scene in an abortion clinic: the patient is ready to
go home after her abortion. Before she leaves, however, there is one more
thing she wants to do. She enters the surgery lab with a clinic advocate and
walks to the lab table under the window. There, in a glass lab dish, is her
fetus. The advocate explains, “The dark red tissue at the top of the dish
is endometrial tissue. The spongy pinkish tissue in this corner is the sac
tissue. And this is the fetal tissue on the right. Does this look like what
you expected?” The patient nods. She motions toward the forceps propped
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against the dish and says, “Can I?” The advocate looks to the lab tech,
who nods. The patient puts on the rubber gloves they hand her and picks
up the small forceps, which she uses to grasp the fetus’ tiny hand, moving
it slightly, somewhere between a wave and a handshake. “Goodbye little
baby,” she says softly. “I’m sorry I couldn’t have you right now.” After a
few more moments, she puts down the forceps, removes the gloves, and
hugs the advocate. “Thank you all so much for making this a little easier
for me.”
In the clinic where I work, a lab technician examines every patient’s
post-procedure fetus and supporting tissue, in order to age it (by size) and
to verify that the procedure is complete. In the process, the technician
arranges the different elements of the fetus and tissue so that we may
provide each patient an option to see her post-procedure fetus. About
five percent of the women who have abortions at our clinic choose this
option. We are, of course, very careful to prepare the women for what they
are going to see. We have a fetal development guidebook, put together by
two nurses who worked at our clinic in the 1990s, which we use for this
purpose. With the patient who wishes to see her fetus and tissue, we look
first at a line drawing of a fetus of the same fetal age as the woman’s. The
line drawing is accompanied by descriptive text:
The fetus is approximately 6.1–6.4 inches long. If the fetus is a female, the
uterus is formed and the vagina starts developing. If the fetus is a male, the
testicles begin to move from the abdomen down into the scrotum. The toenails
are beginning to develop. (18 wks fetal age; 20 wks LMP)

In addition to this description, the text notes that “most internal organs
are rather well developed. However, the lungs and nervous system are
still not mature and if the fetus were born prematurely, it would not
survive.”
While going over this page with the patient, I explain that a fetus or
baby develops like a house is built—the outside develops first, and then
the organs are able to develop within the completed shell. This is why,
for example, at 20 weeks LMP, the fetus has toenails but not yet working lungs or nervous system. I ask the woman if she has any questions,
and I answer those as completely and accurately as I can, checking with
the doctor or head nurse when necessary. After I answer her questions, I
ask her if she is still interested in seeing her own post-abortion fetus and
tissue. If she is, I explain that I will next show her another picture from the
fetal development guidebook, a picture of similarly aged fetus and tissue
after an abortion done at our clinic. This picture is a color photograph
taken by a nurse (with permission, of course) of post-abortion fetus and
tissue arranged in a backlit glass dish on a light box. The technician had
arranged the elements so that the endometrial tissue, the sac tissue, and
the fetal body are distinctly recognizable. Depending upon the age of the
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fetus, the woman might see tiny little dark spots, which are eye buds, and
some flipper-like limbs, or she might see a small ribcage and fully-formed
legs and arms, and when second-trimester intact abortions were still legal,
she might have seen a small, intact, fully-formed body.
Many women, of course, choose not to see their fetuses. The women
who do give a variety of reasons for that choice. Several tell me that they
are “just curious,” that they have seen pro-life images of abortion or of
fetuses and are interested in what “it really looks like.” Other women say
that seeing their fetus provides them with a sense of finality—they can see
that the pregnancy is no longer in their bodies, and this reassures them.
Some women choose to see their fetuses because they want to say goodbye, and some ask us to pray with them or for permission to sprinkle the
fetus with holy water that they have brought with them. This, I think, is
the perspective that makes some abortion rights advocates uncomfortable.
But if abortion rights discourse embraced discussion and images of the
fetus and honest stories of the full range—from joy to grief—of women’s
relationships to their fetuses and emotional responses to abortion, perhaps
we could challenge the simple dichotomization of woman from fetus.
Laury Oaks argues that the international pro-choice movement needs “a
reproductive politics that takes seriously both fetuses as subjects in general, and how women ‘see’ their fetuses in particular” (1999, 192). Frances
Kissling’s article, and the outcry surrounding it, prove Oaks’ point. When
a patient at our clinic takes my hand, looks into the glass dish with her
fetus in it, and says, “That’s what I thought it would be,” I feel we have
allowed that woman to make the best choice for herself in a supportive
environment while taking seriously her relationship with her fetus. We
have provided her a space from which to iterate her own abortion experience, in the words of Judith Arcana, with “open recognition of [her] regret
or loss or joy or relief—even of mourning—and [with] acceptance of the
responsibility of [her] choice” (1994, 163).
Jeannie Ludlow is lecturer and undergraduate advisor in Women’s Studies at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. Her
scholarship focuses on U.S. abortion praxis and embodiment, and she
is currently finishing work on redefinitions of embodiment within the
“feminist pro-life movement.” Send correspondence to jludlow@bgsu.
edu.

Notes
1. For generous feedback and ongoing support, I thank Ellen Berry, Rachel Buff,
Marcus Ricci, and Vicki Patraka, members of the Summer Writing Group (Kim
Coates, Susie Castellanos, Mandy Heddle, Nancy Patterson, and John Warren)
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and of the Faculty Writing Group at the BGSU Institute for the Study of Culture and Society (Jonathon Chambers, Kim Coates, Becca Cragin, Beth GreichPollele, Vikki Krane, Vicki Patraka, and John Warren) for reading versions of
this paper. In addition, the anonymous readers for NWSAJ were invaluable to
the process of honing my argument. Thank you to the two research assistants
who helped with this project, Jesse Houf and Megan Scanlon, both of whom
know well what clinic work is like. This essay is dedicated to my co-workers
and patients at the abortion clinic where I work.
2. I recognize that my claim might seem overblown; I make it based on others’
responses. In fact, although one of the anonymous readers for NWSAJ
“worr[ied]” that I was “overstat[ing]” this risk, another asked me to consider
whether having accurate representation of women’s abortion experiences “is
more important than losing the right to choose” and a third suggested that my
approach might “just put women and feminists in a position where they have
to justify ‘killing’ and where they have to endure further criminalization.”
Although I respect these concerns, I trust that my argument makes evident
my dedication to abortion rights and my conviction that these accounts can
do the abortion rights movement much more good than harm.
3. Other feminist critics have published studies that examine what goes on
in abortion clinics. One of the best is Wendy Simonds’ Abortion at Work
(1996), an ethnographic study of one clinic’s staff, which focuses on the labor,
politics, and interpersonal relationships of those who work to provide safe
and legal abortions. Elizabeth Poppema’s memoir, Why I Am an Abortion
Doctor (1996), describes abortion provision from a physician’s perspective,
while two collections of women’s personal abortion stories, Our Choices, Our
Lives (2002), edited by Krista Jacob, and Abortion: A Collective Story (2002),
by Cara J. MariAnna provide patients’ descriptions of their experiences with
abortion.
4. The phrase “head-first presentation” is either an error in the law or a loophole:
the D&X procedure would not be performed using a head-first removal of the
fetal body. The whole purpose of the intrauterine cranial decompression (which
the congressional findings calls “removing the baby’s brains”) is to allow the
fetal head, the largest part of the fetal body, to be removed through the woman’s
cervix without extensive cervical dilation. If a head-first presentation were
being performed at this stage of pregnancy (after twenty weeks), the most
likely methods would be hysterotomy (surgical removal of the fetus through
the abdominal wall) or induction abortion, in which a substance is introduced
into the fetal body, labor is induced and the woman gives birth to a dead fetus/
baby. This is only one example of the ban’s ambiguities, which many critics
argue point to its potential applicability to multiple abortion procedures. Since
the law includes description of a head-first presentation, it could possibly be
applied to induction abortion or hysterotomy as well as D&X.
5. It is ironic that the activists and politicians who have for years invoked representations of dismembered fetuses to show how terrible abortion is have

48

Jeannie Ludlow

now made it nearly impossible for women to obtain abortions that do not
dismember fetuses.
6. I am not claiming universality here. Feminist author Renate Klein reminds me
that not all clinics and not all doctors are like the ones I have been fortunate
to work with. I thank her for her thoughtful responses to my work and for
her encouragement.
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